aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/security
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2010-08-182-10/+8
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: fs: brlock vfsmount_lock fs: scale files_lock lglock: introduce special lglock and brlock spin locks tty: fix fu_list abuse fs: cleanup files_lock locking fs: remove extra lookup in __lookup_hash fs: fs_struct rwlock to spinlock apparmor: use task path helpers fs: dentry allocation consolidation fs: fix do_lookup false negative mbcache: Limit the maximum number of cache entries hostfs ->follow_link() braino hostfs: dumb (and usually harmless) tpyo - strncpy instead of strlcpy remove SWRITE* I/O types kill BH_Ordered flag vfs: update ctime when changing the file's permission by setfacl cramfs: only unlock new inodes fix reiserfs_evict_inode end_writeback second call
| * tty: fix fu_list abuseNick Piggin2010-08-181-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | tty: fix fu_list abuse tty code abuses fu_list, which causes a bug in remount,ro handling. If a tty device node is opened on a filesystem, then the last link to the inode removed, the filesystem will be allowed to be remounted readonly. This is because fs_may_remount_ro does not find the 0 link tty inode on the file sb list (because the tty code incorrectly removed it to use for its own purpose). This can result in a filesystem with errors after it is marked "clean". Taking idea from Christoph's initial patch, allocate a tty private struct at file->private_data and put our required list fields in there, linking file and tty. This makes tty nodes behave the same way as other device nodes and avoid meddling with the vfs, and avoids this bug. The error handling is not trivial in the tty code, so for this bugfix, I take the simple approach of using __GFP_NOFAIL and don't worry about memory errors. This is not a problem because our allocator doesn't fail small allocs as a rule anyway. So proper error handling is left as an exercise for tty hackers. [ Arguably filesystem's device inode would ideally be divorced from the driver's pseudo inode when it is opened, but in practice it's not clear whether that will ever be worth implementing. ] Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * fs: cleanup files_lock lockingNick Piggin2010-08-181-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | fs: cleanup files_lock locking Lock tty_files with a new spinlock, tty_files_lock; provide helpers to manipulate the per-sb files list; unexport the files_lock spinlock. Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Acked-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * apparmor: use task path helpersNick Piggin2010-08-181-7/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | apparmor: use task path helpers Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2010-08-171-2/+2
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: AppArmor: fix task_setrlimit prototype
| * | AppArmor: fix task_setrlimit prototypeJiri Slaby2010-08-171-2/+2
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | After rlimits tree was merged we get the following errors: security/apparmor/lsm.c:663:2: warning: initialization from incompatible pointer type It is because AppArmor was merged in the meantime, but uses the old prototype. So fix it by adding struct task_struct as a first parameter of apparmor_task_setrlimit. NOTE that this is ONLY a compilation warning fix (and crashes caused by that). It needs proper handling in AppArmor depending on who is the 'task'. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* / Make do_execve() take a const filename pointerDavid Howells2010-08-171-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make do_execve() take a const filename pointer so that kernel_execve() compiles correctly on ARM: arch/arm/kernel/sys_arm.c:88: warning: passing argument 1 of 'do_execve' discards qualifiers from pointer target type This also requires the argv and envp arguments to be consted twice, once for the pointer array and once for the strings the array points to. This is because do_execve() passes a pointer to the filename (now const) to copy_strings_kernel(). A simpler alternative would be to cast the filename pointer in do_execve() when it's passed to copy_strings_kernel(). do_execve() may not change any of the strings it is passed as part of the argv or envp lists as they are some of them in .rodata, so marking these strings as const should be fine. Further kernel_execve() and sys_execve() need to be changed to match. This has been test built on x86_64, frv, arm and mips. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'params' of ↵Linus Torvalds2010-08-121-12/+24
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux-2.6-for-linus * 'params' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux-2.6-for-linus: (22 commits) param: don't deref arg in __same_type() checks param: update drivers/acpi/debug.c to new scheme param: use module_param in drivers/message/fusion/mptbase.c ide: use module_param_named rather than module_param_call param: update drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_watchdog.c to new scheme param: lock if_sdio's lbs_helper_name and lbs_fw_name against sysfs changes. param: lock myri10ge_fw_name against sysfs changes. param: simple locking for sysfs-writable charp parameters param: remove unnecessary writable charp param: add kerneldoc to moduleparam.h param: locking for kernel parameters param: make param sections const. param: use free hook for charp (fix leak of charp parameters) param: add a free hook to kernel_param_ops. param: silence .init.text references from param ops Add param ops struct for hvc_iucv driver. nfs: update for module_param_named API change AppArmor: update for module_param_named API change param: use ops in struct kernel_param, rather than get and set fns directly param: move the EXPORT_SYMBOL to after the definitions. ...
| * AppArmor: update for module_param_named API changeStephen Rothwell2010-08-111-12/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fixes these build errors: security/apparmor/lsm.c:701: error: 'param_ops_aabool' undeclared here (not in a function) security/apparmor/lsm.c:721: error: 'param_ops_aalockpolicy' undeclared here (not in a function) security/apparmor/lsm.c:729: error: 'param_ops_aauint' undeclared here (not in a function) Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
* | Add a dummy printk function for the maintenance of unused printksDavid Howells2010-08-121-5/+0
|/ | | | | | | | Add a dummy printk function for the maintenance of unused printks through gcc format checking, and also so that side-effect checking is maintained too. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'writable_limits' of git://decibel.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/linuxLinus Torvalds2010-08-103-7/+13
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * 'writable_limits' of git://decibel.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/linux: unistd: add __NR_prlimit64 syscall numbers rlimits: implement prlimit64 syscall rlimits: switch more rlimit syscalls to do_prlimit rlimits: redo do_setrlimit to more generic do_prlimit rlimits: add rlimit64 structure rlimits: do security check under task_lock rlimits: allow setrlimit to non-current tasks rlimits: split sys_setrlimit rlimits: selinux, do rlimits changes under task_lock rlimits: make sure ->rlim_max never grows in sys_setrlimit rlimits: add task_struct to update_rlimit_cpu rlimits: security, add task_struct to setrlimit Fix up various system call number conflicts. We not only added fanotify system calls in the meantime, but asm-generic/unistd.h added a wait4 along with a range of reserved per-architecture system calls.
| * rlimits: selinux, do rlimits changes under task_lockOleg Nesterov2010-07-161-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When doing an exec, selinux updates rlimits in its code of current process depending on current max. Make sure max or cur doesn't change in the meantime by grabbing task_lock which do_prlimit needs for changing limits too. While at it, use rlimit helper for accessing CPU rlimit a line below. To have a volatile access too. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
| * rlimits: add task_struct to update_rlimit_cpuJiri Slaby2010-07-161-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add task_struct as a parameter to update_rlimit_cpu to be able to set rlimit_cpu of different task than current. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * rlimits: security, add task_struct to setrlimitJiri Slaby2010-07-163-6/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add task_struct to task_setrlimit of security_operations to be able to set rlimit of task other than current. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/notifyLinus Torvalds2010-08-101-2/+14
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * 'for-linus' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/notify: (132 commits) fanotify: use both marks when possible fsnotify: pass both the vfsmount mark and inode mark fsnotify: walk the inode and vfsmount lists simultaneously fsnotify: rework ignored mark flushing fsnotify: remove global fsnotify groups lists fsnotify: remove group->mask fsnotify: remove the global masks fsnotify: cleanup should_send_event fanotify: use the mark in handler functions audit: use the mark in handler functions dnotify: use the mark in handler functions inotify: use the mark in handler functions fsnotify: send fsnotify_mark to groups in event handling functions fsnotify: Exchange list heads instead of moving elements fsnotify: srcu to protect read side of inode and vfsmount locks fsnotify: use an explicit flag to indicate fsnotify_destroy_mark has been called fsnotify: use _rcu functions for mark list traversal fsnotify: place marks on object in order of group memory address vfs/fsnotify: fsnotify_close can delay the final work in fput fsnotify: store struct file not struct path ... Fix up trivial delete/modify conflict in fs/notify/inotify/inotify.c.
| * | fsnotify: new fsnotify hooks and events types for access decisionsEric Paris2010-07-281-2/+14
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | introduce a new fsnotify hook, fsnotify_perm(), which is called from the security code. This hook is used to allow fsnotify groups to make access control decisions about events on the system. We also must change the generic fsnotify function to return an error code if we intend these hooks to be in any way useful. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2010-08-071-1/+1
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: SELINUX: Fix build error.
| * | SELINUX: Fix build error.Ralf Baechle2010-08-061-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix build error caused by a stale security/selinux/av_permissions.h in the $(src) directory which will override a more recent version in $(obj) that is it appears to strike only when building with a separate object directory. Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | KEYS: request_key() should return -ENOKEY if the constructed key is negativeDavid Howells2010-08-061-0/+2
|/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | request_key() should return -ENOKEY if the key it constructs has been negatively instantiated. Without this, request_key() can return an unusable key to its caller, and if the caller then does key_validate() that won't catch the problem. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | apparmor: depends on NETRandy Dunlap2010-08-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SECURITY_APPARMOR should depend on NET since AUDIT needs (depends on) NET. Fixes 70-80 errors that occur when CONFIG_NET is not enabled, but APPARMOR selects AUDIT without qualification. E.g.: audit.c:(.text+0x33361): undefined reference to `netlink_unicast' (.text+0x333df): undefined reference to `netlink_unicast' audit.c:(.text+0x3341d): undefined reference to `skb_queue_tail' audit.c:(.text+0x33424): undefined reference to `kfree_skb' audit.c:(.text+0x334cb): undefined reference to `kfree_skb' audit.c:(.text+0x33597): undefined reference to `skb_put' audit.c:(.text+0x3369b): undefined reference to `__alloc_skb' audit.c:(.text+0x336d7): undefined reference to `kfree_skb' (.text+0x3374c): undefined reference to `__alloc_skb' auditfilter.c:(.text+0x35305): undefined reference to `skb_queue_tail' lsm_audit.c:(.text+0x2873): undefined reference to `init_net' lsm_audit.c:(.text+0x2878): undefined reference to `dev_get_by_index' Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | Merge branch 'for-next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2010-08-041-1/+1
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial * 'for-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial: (48 commits) Documentation: update broken web addresses. fix comment typo "choosed" -> "chosen" hostap:hostap_hw.c Fix typo in comment Fix spelling contorller -> controller in comments Kconfig.debug: FAIL_IO_TIMEOUT: typo Faul -> Fault fs/Kconfig: Fix typo Userpace -> Userspace Removing dead MACH_U300_BS26 drivers/infiniband: Remove unnecessary casts of private_data fs/ocfs2: Remove unnecessary casts of private_data libfc: use ARRAY_SIZE scsi: bfa: use ARRAY_SIZE drm: i915: use ARRAY_SIZE drm: drm_edid: use ARRAY_SIZE synclink: use ARRAY_SIZE block: cciss: use ARRAY_SIZE comment typo fixes: charater => character fix comment typos concerning "challenge" arm: plat-spear: fix typo in kerneldoc reiserfs: typo comment fix update email address ...
| * | Merge branch 'master' into for-nextJiri Kosina2010-08-041-2/+2
| |\|
| * | Merge branch 'master' into for-nextJiri Kosina2010-06-167-54/+46
| |\ \
| * | | fix typos concerning "initiali[zs]e"Uwe Kleine-König2010-06-161-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
* | | | AppArmor: fix build warnings for non-const use of get_task_credJames Morris2010-08-022-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix build warnings for non-const use of get_task_cred. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | selinux: convert the policy type_attr_map to flex_arrayEric Paris2010-08-023-13/+39
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Current selinux policy can have over 3000 types. The type_attr_map in policy is an array sized by the number of types times sizeof(struct ebitmap) (12 on x86_64). Basic math tells us the array is going to be of length 3000 x 12 = 36,000 bytes. The largest 'safe' allocation on a long running system is 16k. Most of the time a 32k allocation will work. But on long running systems a 64k allocation (what we need) can fail quite regularly. In order to deal with this I am converting the type_attr_map to use flex_arrays. Let the library code deal with breaking this into PAGE_SIZE pieces. -v2 rework some of the if(!obj) BUG() to be BUG_ON(!obj) drop flex_array_put() calls and just use a _get() object directly -v3 make apply to James' tree (drop the policydb_write changes) Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | AppArmor: Enable configuring and building of the AppArmor security moduleJohn Johansen2010-08-023-0/+60
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Kconfig and Makefiles to enable configuration and building of AppArmor. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | TOMOYO: Use pathname specified by policy rather than execve()Tetsuo Handa2010-08-025-23/+48
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit c9e69318 "TOMOYO: Allow wildcard for execute permission." changed execute permission and domainname to accept wildcards. But tomoyo_find_next_domain() was using pathname passed to execve() rather than pathname specified by the execute permission. As a result, processes were not able to transit to domains which contain wildcards in their domainnames. This patch passes pathname specified by the execute permission back to tomoyo_find_next_domain() so that processes can transit to domains which contain wildcards in their domainnames. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | AppArmor: update path_truncate method to latest versionJames Morris2010-08-021-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove extraneous path_truncate arguments from the AppArmor hook, as they've been removed from the LSM API. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | AppArmor: core policy routinesJohn Johansen2010-08-024-0/+1568
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policyJohn Johansen2010-08-022-0/+723
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | AppArmor policy is loaded in a platform independent flattened binary stream. Verify and unpack the data converting it to the internal format needed for enforcement. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | AppArmor: mediation of non file objectsJohn Johansen2010-08-026-0/+508
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | AppArmor: LSM interface, and security module initializationJohn Johansen2010-08-021-0/+939
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | AppArmor hooks to interface with the LSM, module parameters and module initialization. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | AppArmor: Enable configuring and building of the AppArmor security moduleJohn Johansen2010-08-022-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Kconfig and Makefiles to enable configuration and building of AppArmor. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | AppArmor: functions for domain transitionsJohn Johansen2010-08-022-0/+859
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | AppArmor routines for controling domain transitions, which can occur at exec or through self directed change_profile/change_hat calls. Unconfined tasks are checked at exec against the profiles in the confining profile namespace to determine if a profile should be attached to the task. Confined tasks execs are controlled by the profile which provides rules determining which execs are allowed and if so which profiles should be transitioned to. Self directed domain transitions allow a task to request transition to a given profile. If the transition is allowed then the profile will be applied, either immeditately or at exec time depending on the request. Immeditate self directed transitions have several security limitations but have uses in setting up stub transition profiles and other limited cases. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | AppArmor: file enforcement routinesJohn Johansen2010-08-022-0/+674
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | AppArmor does files enforcement via pathname matching. Matching is done at file open using a dfa match engine. Permission is against the final file object not parent directories, ie. the traversal of directories as part of the file match is implicitly allowed. In the case of nonexistant files (creation) permissions are checked against the target file not the directory. eg. In case of creating the file /dir/new, permissions are checked against the match /dir/new not against /dir/. The permissions for matches are currently stored in the dfa accept table, but this will change to allow for dfa reuse and also to allow for sharing of wider accept states. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | AppArmor: userspace interfacesJohn Johansen2010-08-024-0/+455
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The /proc/<pid>/attr/* interface is used for process introspection and commands. While the apparmorfs interface is used for global introspection and loading and removing policy. The interface currently only contains the files necessary for loading policy, and will be extended in the future to include sysfs style single per file introspection inteface. The old AppArmor 2.4 interface files have been removed into a compatibility patch, that distros can use to maintain backwards compatibility. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | AppArmor: dfa match engineJohn Johansen2010-08-022-0/+485
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A basic dfa matching engine based off the dfa engine in the Dragon Book. It uses simple row comb compression with a check field. This allows AppArmor to do pattern matching in linear time, and also avoids stack issues that an nfa based engine may have. The dfa engine uses a byte based comparison, with all values being valid. Any potential character encoding are handled user side when the dfa tables are created. By convention AppArmor uses \0 to separate two dependent path matches since \0 is not a valid path character (this is done in the link permission check). The dfa tables are generated in user space and are verified at load time to be internally consistent. There are several future improvements planned for the dfa engine: * The dfa engine may be converted to a hybrid nfa-dfa engine, with a fixed size limited stack. This would allow for size time tradeoffs, by inserting limited nfa states to help control state explosion that can occur with dfas. * The dfa engine may pickup the ability to do limited dynamic variable matching, instead of fixing all variables at policy load time. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | AppArmor: contexts used in attaching policy to system objectsJohn Johansen2010-08-022-0/+370
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | AppArmor contexts attach profiles and state to tasks, files, etc. when a direct profile reference is not sufficient. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | AppArmor: basic auditing infrastructure.John Johansen2010-08-022-0/+338
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Update lsm_audit for AppArmor specific data, and add the core routines for AppArmor uses for auditing. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | AppArmor: misc. base functions and definesJohn Johansen2010-08-024-0/+491
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Miscellaneous functions and defines needed by AppArmor, including the base path resolution routines. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | TOMOYO: Update version to 2.3.0Tetsuo Handa2010-08-021-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | TOMOYO: Fix quota check.Tetsuo Handa2010-08-021-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit d74725b9 "TOMOYO: Use callback for updating entries." broke tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok() by counting deleted entries. It needs to count non-deleted entries. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | SELinux: Move execmod to the common permsEric Paris2010-08-021-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | execmod "could" show up on non regular files and non chr files. The current implementation would actually make these checks against non-existant bits since the code assumes the execmod permission is same for all file types. To make this line up for chr files we had to define execute_no_trans and entrypoint permissions. These permissions are unreachable and only existed to to make FILE__EXECMOD and CHR_FILE__EXECMOD the same. This patch drops those needless perms as well. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | selinux: place open in the common file permsEric Paris2010-08-022-28/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | kernel can dynamically remap perms. Drop the open lookup table and put open in the common file perms. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | SELinux: special dontaudit for access checksEric Paris2010-08-023-8/+38
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently there are a number of applications (nautilus being the main one) which calls access() on files in order to determine how they should be displayed. It is normal and expected that nautilus will want to see if files are executable or if they are really read/write-able. access() should return the real permission. SELinux policy checks are done in access() and can result in lots of AVC denials as policy denies RWX on files which DAC allows. Currently SELinux must dontaudit actual attempts to read/write/execute a file in order to silence these messages (and not flood the logs.) But dontaudit rules like that can hide real attacks. This patch addes a new common file permission audit_access. This permission is special in that it is meaningless and should never show up in an allow rule. Instead the only place this permission has meaning is in a dontaudit rule like so: dontaudit nautilus_t sbin_t:file audit_access With such a rule if nautilus just checks access() we will still get denied and thus userspace will still get the correct answer but we will not log the denial. If nautilus attempted to actually perform one of the forbidden actions (rather than just querying access(2) about it) we would still log a denial. This type of dontaudit rule should be used sparingly, as it could be a method for an attacker to probe the system permissions without detection. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | security: make LSMs explicitly mask off permissionsEric Paris2010-08-022-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SELinux needs to pass the MAY_ACCESS flag so it can handle auditting correctly. Presently the masking of MAY_* flags is done in the VFS. In order to allow LSMs to decide what flags they care about and what flags they don't just pass them all and the each LSM mask off what they don't need. This patch should contain no functional changes to either the VFS or any LSM. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | SELinux: break ocontext reading into a separate functionEric Paris2010-08-021-111/+133
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the reading of ocontext type data out of policydb_read() in a separate function ocontext_read() Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | SELinux: move genfs read to a separate functionEric Paris2010-08-021-105/+133
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | move genfs read functionality out of policydb_read() and into a new function called genfs_read() Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | | selinux: fix error codes in symtab_init()Dan Carpenter2010-08-021-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | hashtab_create() only returns NULL on allocation failures to -ENOMEM is appropriate here. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>