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* selinux: support deferred mapping of contextsStephen Smalley2008-07-141-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce SELinux support for deferred mapping of security contexts in the SID table upon policy reload, and use this support for inode security contexts when the context is not yet valid under the current policy. Only processes with CAP_MAC_ADMIN + mac_admin permission in policy can set undefined security contexts on inodes. Inodes with such undefined contexts are treated as having the unlabeled context until the context becomes valid upon a policy reload that defines the context. Context invalidation upon policy reload also uses this support to save the context information in the SID table and later recover it upon a subsequent policy reload that defines the context again. This support is to enable package managers and similar programs to set down file contexts unknown to the system policy at the time the file is created in order to better support placing loadable policy modules in packages and to support build systems that need to create images of different distro releases with different policies w/o requiring all of the contexts to be defined or legal in the build host policy. With this patch applied, the following sequence is possible, although in practice it is recommended that this permission only be allowed to specific program domains such as the package manager. # rmdir baz # rm bar # touch bar # chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument # mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument # cat setundefined.te policy_module(setundefined, 1.0) require { type unconfined_t; type unlabeled_t; } files_type(unlabeled_t) allow unconfined_t self:capability2 mac_admin; # make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile setundefined.pp # semodule -i setundefined.pp # chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined # mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t baz # cat foo.te policy_module(foo, 1.0) type foo_exec_t; files_type(foo_exec_t) # make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile foo.pp # semodule -i foo.pp # defines foo_exec_t # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz # semodule -r foo # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t baz # semodule -i foo.pp # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz # semodule -r setundefined foo # chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # no longer defined and not allowed chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument # rmdir baz # mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: mls.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanupsEric Paris2008-04-281-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | This patch changes mls.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that are fixed may include (does not not have to include) spaces used instead of tabs Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: add more validity checks on policy loadStephen Smalley2007-11-081-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Add more validity checks at policy load time to reject malformed policies and prevent subsequent out-of-range indexing when in permissive mode. Resolves the NULL pointer dereference reported in https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=357541. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: Delete mls_copy_contextVenkat Yekkirala2007-01-081-20/+0
| | | | | | | | | This deletes mls_copy_context() in favor of mls_context_cpy() and replaces mls_scopy_context() with mls_context_cpy_low(). Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* NetLabel: convert to an extensibile/sparse category bitmapPaul Moore2006-12-021-14/+32
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The original NetLabel category bitmap was a straight char bitmap which worked fine for the initial release as it only supported 240 bits due to limitations in the CIPSO restricted bitmap tag (tag type 0x01). This patch converts that straight char bitmap into an extensibile/sparse bitmap in order to lay the foundation for other CIPSO tag types and protocols. This patch also has a nice side effect in that all of the security attributes passed by NetLabel into the LSM are now in a format which is in the host's native byte/bit ordering which makes the LSM specific code much simpler; look at the changes in security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c as an example. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* [NetLabel]: SELinux supportVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-221-0/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add NetLabel support to the SELinux LSM and modify the socket_post_create() LSM hook to return an error code. The most significant part of this patch is the addition of NetLabel hooks into the following SELinux LSM hooks: * selinux_file_permission() * selinux_socket_sendmsg() * selinux_socket_post_create() * selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb() * selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream() * selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram() * selinux_sock_graft() * selinux_inet_conn_request() The basic reasoning behind this patch is that outgoing packets are "NetLabel'd" by labeling their socket and the NetLabel security attributes are checked via the additional hook in selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(). NetLabel itself is only a labeling mechanism, similar to filesystem extended attributes, it is up to the SELinux enforcement mechanism to perform the actual access checks. In addition to the changes outlined above this patch also includes some changes to the extended bitmap (ebitmap) and multi-level security (mls) code to import and export SELinux TE/MLS attributes into and out of NetLabel. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Define new SELinux service routineVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-221-0/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | This defines a routine that combines the Type Enforcement portion of one sid with the MLS portion from the other sid to arrive at a new sid. This would be used to define a sid for a security association that is to be negotiated by IKE as well as for determing the sid for open requests and connection-oriented child sockets. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] support for context based audit filteringDarrel Goeddel2006-05-011-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The following patch provides selinux interfaces that will allow the audit system to perform filtering based on the process context (user, role, type, sensitivity, and clearance). These interfaces will allow the selinux module to perform efficient matches based on lower level selinux constructs, rather than relying on context retrievals and string comparisons within the audit module. It also allows for dominance checks on the mls portion of the contexts that are impossible with only string comparisons. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] SELinux: default labeling of MLS fieldJames Morris2005-07-281-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Implement kernel labeling of the MLS (multilevel security) field of security contexts for files which have no existing MLS field. This is to enable upgrades of a system from non-MLS to MLS without performing a full filesystem relabel including all of the mountpoints, which would be quite painful for users. With this patch, with MLS enabled, if a file has no MLS field, the kernel internally adds an MLS field to the in-core inode (but not to the on-disk file). This MLS field added is the default for the superblock, allowing per-mountpoint control over the values via fixed policy or mount options. This patch has been tested by enabling MLS without relabeling its filesystem, and seems to be working correctly. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* Linux-2.6.12-rc2v2.6.12-rc2Linus Torvalds2005-04-161-0/+42
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!