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* .gitignore: ignore apparmor/rlim_names.hYong Zhang2010-10-211-0/+1
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* AppArmor: Fix locking from removal of profile namespaceJohn Johansen2010-09-081-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | The locking for profile namespace removal is wrong, when removing a profile namespace, it needs to be removed from its parent's list. Lock the parent of namespace list instead of the namespace being removed. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* AppArmor: Fix splitting an fqname into separate namespace and profile namesJohn Johansen2010-09-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As per Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> If we have a ns name without a following profile then in the original code it did "*ns_name = &name[1];". "name" is NULL so "*ns_name" is 0x1. That isn't useful and could cause an oops when this function is called from aa_remove_profiles(). Beyond this the assignment of the namespace name was wrong in the case where the profile name was provided as it was being set to &name[1] after name = skip_spaces(split + 1); Move the ns_name assignment before updating name for the split and also add skip_spaces, making the interface more robust. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* AppArmor: Fix security_task_setrlimit logic for 2.6.36 changesJohn Johansen2010-09-083-11/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | 2.6.36 introduced the abilitiy to specify the task that is having its rlimits set. Update mediation to ensure that confined tasks can only set their own group_leader as expected by current policy. Add TODO note about extending policy to support setting other tasks rlimits. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* AppArmor: Drop hack to remove appended " (deleted)" stringJohn Johansen2010-09-081-27/+11
| | | | | | | | | The 2.6.36 kernel has refactored __d_path() so that it no longer appends " (deleted)" to unlinked paths. So drop the hack that was used to detect and remove the appended string. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2010-08-181-7/+2
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: fs: brlock vfsmount_lock fs: scale files_lock lglock: introduce special lglock and brlock spin locks tty: fix fu_list abuse fs: cleanup files_lock locking fs: remove extra lookup in __lookup_hash fs: fs_struct rwlock to spinlock apparmor: use task path helpers fs: dentry allocation consolidation fs: fix do_lookup false negative mbcache: Limit the maximum number of cache entries hostfs ->follow_link() braino hostfs: dumb (and usually harmless) tpyo - strncpy instead of strlcpy remove SWRITE* I/O types kill BH_Ordered flag vfs: update ctime when changing the file's permission by setfacl cramfs: only unlock new inodes fix reiserfs_evict_inode end_writeback second call
| * apparmor: use task path helpersNick Piggin2010-08-181-7/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | apparmor: use task path helpers Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | AppArmor: fix task_setrlimit prototypeJiri Slaby2010-08-171-2/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | After rlimits tree was merged we get the following errors: security/apparmor/lsm.c:663:2: warning: initialization from incompatible pointer type It is because AppArmor was merged in the meantime, but uses the old prototype. So fix it by adding struct task_struct as a first parameter of apparmor_task_setrlimit. NOTE that this is ONLY a compilation warning fix (and crashes caused by that). It needs proper handling in AppArmor depending on who is the 'task'. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* AppArmor: update for module_param_named API changeStephen Rothwell2010-08-111-12/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | Fixes these build errors: security/apparmor/lsm.c:701: error: 'param_ops_aabool' undeclared here (not in a function) security/apparmor/lsm.c:721: error: 'param_ops_aalockpolicy' undeclared here (not in a function) security/apparmor/lsm.c:729: error: 'param_ops_aauint' undeclared here (not in a function) Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
* apparmor: depends on NETRandy Dunlap2010-08-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SECURITY_APPARMOR should depend on NET since AUDIT needs (depends on) NET. Fixes 70-80 errors that occur when CONFIG_NET is not enabled, but APPARMOR selects AUDIT without qualification. E.g.: audit.c:(.text+0x33361): undefined reference to `netlink_unicast' (.text+0x333df): undefined reference to `netlink_unicast' audit.c:(.text+0x3341d): undefined reference to `skb_queue_tail' audit.c:(.text+0x33424): undefined reference to `kfree_skb' audit.c:(.text+0x334cb): undefined reference to `kfree_skb' audit.c:(.text+0x33597): undefined reference to `skb_put' audit.c:(.text+0x3369b): undefined reference to `__alloc_skb' audit.c:(.text+0x336d7): undefined reference to `kfree_skb' (.text+0x3374c): undefined reference to `__alloc_skb' auditfilter.c:(.text+0x35305): undefined reference to `skb_queue_tail' lsm_audit.c:(.text+0x2873): undefined reference to `init_net' lsm_audit.c:(.text+0x2878): undefined reference to `dev_get_by_index' Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* AppArmor: fix build warnings for non-const use of get_task_credJames Morris2010-08-022-2/+2
| | | | | | Fix build warnings for non-const use of get_task_cred. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* AppArmor: Enable configuring and building of the AppArmor security moduleJohn Johansen2010-08-023-0/+60
| | | | | | | Kconfig and Makefiles to enable configuration and building of AppArmor. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* AppArmor: update path_truncate method to latest versionJames Morris2010-08-021-2/+1
| | | | | | | Remove extraneous path_truncate arguments from the AppArmor hook, as they've been removed from the LSM API. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* AppArmor: core policy routinesJohn Johansen2010-08-024-0/+1568
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policyJohn Johansen2010-08-022-0/+723
| | | | | | | | | AppArmor policy is loaded in a platform independent flattened binary stream. Verify and unpack the data converting it to the internal format needed for enforcement. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* AppArmor: mediation of non file objectsJohn Johansen2010-08-026-0/+508
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* AppArmor: LSM interface, and security module initializationJohn Johansen2010-08-021-0/+939
| | | | | | | | AppArmor hooks to interface with the LSM, module parameters and module initialization. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* AppArmor: functions for domain transitionsJohn Johansen2010-08-022-0/+859
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | AppArmor routines for controling domain transitions, which can occur at exec or through self directed change_profile/change_hat calls. Unconfined tasks are checked at exec against the profiles in the confining profile namespace to determine if a profile should be attached to the task. Confined tasks execs are controlled by the profile which provides rules determining which execs are allowed and if so which profiles should be transitioned to. Self directed domain transitions allow a task to request transition to a given profile. If the transition is allowed then the profile will be applied, either immeditately or at exec time depending on the request. Immeditate self directed transitions have several security limitations but have uses in setting up stub transition profiles and other limited cases. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* AppArmor: file enforcement routinesJohn Johansen2010-08-022-0/+674
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | AppArmor does files enforcement via pathname matching. Matching is done at file open using a dfa match engine. Permission is against the final file object not parent directories, ie. the traversal of directories as part of the file match is implicitly allowed. In the case of nonexistant files (creation) permissions are checked against the target file not the directory. eg. In case of creating the file /dir/new, permissions are checked against the match /dir/new not against /dir/. The permissions for matches are currently stored in the dfa accept table, but this will change to allow for dfa reuse and also to allow for sharing of wider accept states. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* AppArmor: userspace interfacesJohn Johansen2010-08-024-0/+455
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The /proc/<pid>/attr/* interface is used for process introspection and commands. While the apparmorfs interface is used for global introspection and loading and removing policy. The interface currently only contains the files necessary for loading policy, and will be extended in the future to include sysfs style single per file introspection inteface. The old AppArmor 2.4 interface files have been removed into a compatibility patch, that distros can use to maintain backwards compatibility. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* AppArmor: dfa match engineJohn Johansen2010-08-022-0/+485
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A basic dfa matching engine based off the dfa engine in the Dragon Book. It uses simple row comb compression with a check field. This allows AppArmor to do pattern matching in linear time, and also avoids stack issues that an nfa based engine may have. The dfa engine uses a byte based comparison, with all values being valid. Any potential character encoding are handled user side when the dfa tables are created. By convention AppArmor uses \0 to separate two dependent path matches since \0 is not a valid path character (this is done in the link permission check). The dfa tables are generated in user space and are verified at load time to be internally consistent. There are several future improvements planned for the dfa engine: * The dfa engine may be converted to a hybrid nfa-dfa engine, with a fixed size limited stack. This would allow for size time tradeoffs, by inserting limited nfa states to help control state explosion that can occur with dfas. * The dfa engine may pickup the ability to do limited dynamic variable matching, instead of fixing all variables at policy load time. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* AppArmor: contexts used in attaching policy to system objectsJohn Johansen2010-08-022-0/+370
| | | | | | | | AppArmor contexts attach profiles and state to tasks, files, etc. when a direct profile reference is not sufficient. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* AppArmor: basic auditing infrastructure.John Johansen2010-08-022-0/+338
| | | | | | | | Update lsm_audit for AppArmor specific data, and add the core routines for AppArmor uses for auditing. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* AppArmor: misc. base functions and definesJohn Johansen2010-08-024-0/+491
Miscellaneous functions and defines needed by AppArmor, including the base path resolution routines. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>