aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/security
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>2009-07-31 12:53:58 -0400
committerJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>2009-08-06 09:02:17 +1000
commit7c73875e7dda627040b12c19b01db634fa7f0fd1 (patch)
treef8f4df20bdcafb1bd981c8a7b0797d13b2625b27 /security
parent012a5299a29672039f42944a37984558393ef769 (diff)
downloadmrst-s0i3-test-7c73875e7dda627040b12c19b01db634fa7f0fd1.tar.gz
mrst-s0i3-test-7c73875e7dda627040b12c19b01db634fa7f0fd1.tar.xz
mrst-s0i3-test-7c73875e7dda627040b12c19b01db634fa7f0fd1.zip
Capabilities: move cap_file_mmap to commoncap.c
Currently we duplicate the mmap_min_addr test in cap_file_mmap and in security_file_mmap if !CONFIG_SECURITY. This patch moves cap_file_mmap into commoncap.c and then calls that function directly from security_file_mmap ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY like all of the other capability checks are done. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/capability.c9
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c30
2 files changed, 30 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index f218dd36164..ec057305402 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -330,15 +330,6 @@ static int cap_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int command,
return 0;
}
-static int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
- unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
- unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
-{
- if ((addr < mmap_min_addr) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
- return -EACCES;
- return 0;
-}
-
static int cap_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot)
{
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index aa97704564d..3852e943280 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -984,3 +984,33 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
}
+
+/*
+ * cap_file_mmap - check if able to map given addr
+ * @file: unused
+ * @reqprot: unused
+ * @prot: unused
+ * @flags: unused
+ * @addr: address attempting to be mapped
+ * @addr_only: unused
+ *
+ * If the process is attempting to map memory below mmap_min_addr they need
+ * CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the
+ * capability security module. Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed
+ * -EPERM if not.
+ */
+int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
+ unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (addr < mmap_min_addr) {
+ ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
+ SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
+ if (ret == 0)
+ current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}