|author||Christoph Lameter <email@example.com>||2009-06-03 16:04:31 -0400|
|committer||James Morris <firstname.lastname@example.org>||2009-06-04 12:07:48 +1000|
security: use mmap_min_addr indepedently of security models
This patch removes the dependency of mmap_min_addr on CONFIG_SECURITY. It also sets a default mmap_min_addr of 4096. mmapping of addresses below 4096 will only be possible for processes with CAP_SYS_RAWIO. Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <email@example.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <firstname.lastname@example.org> Looks-ok-by: Linus Torvalds <email@example.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/Kconfig')
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 21 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index bb244774e9d..d23c839038f 100644
@@ -110,28 +110,8 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
See <http://www.linuxjournal.com/article.php?sid=6279> for
more information about this module.
- If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
- int "Low address space to protect from user allocation"
- depends on SECURITY
- default 0
- This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
- from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
- can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
- For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
- a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
- On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
- Programs which use vm86 functionality would either need additional
- permissions from either the LSM or the capabilities module or have
- this protection disabled.
- This value can be changed after boot using the
- /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable.
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.