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authorJozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>2009-05-25 17:23:15 +0200
committerPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>2009-05-25 17:23:15 +0200
commitbfcaa50270e18f35220a11d46e98fc6232c24606 (patch)
treedd06bf91db9aff84adf442b6c8aa6be58c923ec0 /net
parentfecc1133b66af6e0cd49115a248f34bbb01f180a (diff)
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netfilter: nf_ct_tcp: fix accepting invalid RST segments
Robert L Mathews discovered that some clients send evil TCP RST segments, which are accepted by netfilter conntrack but discarded by the destination. Thus the conntrack entry is destroyed but the destination retransmits data until timeout. The same technique, i.e. sending properly crafted RST segments, can easily be used to bypass connlimit/connbytes based restrictions (the sample script written by Robert can be found in the netfilter mailing list archives). The patch below adds a new flag and new field to struct ip_ct_tcp_state so that checking RST segments can be made more strict and thus TCP conntrack can catch the invalid ones: the RST segment is accepted only if its sequence number higher than or equal to the highest ack we seen from the other direction. (The last_ack field cannot be reused because it is used to catch resent packets.) Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r--net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c18
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c
index b5ccf2b4b2e..97a6e93d742 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c
@@ -634,6 +634,14 @@ static bool tcp_in_window(const struct nf_conn *ct,
sender->td_end = end;
sender->flags |= IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_DATA_UNACKNOWLEDGED;
}
+ if (tcph->ack) {
+ if (!(sender->flags & IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_MAXACK_SET)) {
+ sender->td_maxack = ack;
+ sender->flags |= IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_MAXACK_SET;
+ } else if (after(ack, sender->td_maxack))
+ sender->td_maxack = ack;
+ }
+
/*
* Update receiver data.
*/
@@ -919,6 +927,16 @@ static int tcp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct,
return -NF_ACCEPT;
case TCP_CONNTRACK_CLOSE:
if (index == TCP_RST_SET
+ && (ct->proto.tcp.seen[!dir].flags & IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_MAXACK_SET)
+ && before(ntohl(th->seq), ct->proto.tcp.seen[!dir].td_maxack)) {
+ /* Invalid RST */
+ write_unlock_bh(&tcp_lock);
+ if (LOG_INVALID(net, IPPROTO_TCP))
+ nf_log_packet(pf, 0, skb, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "nf_ct_tcp: invalid RST ");
+ return -NF_ACCEPT;
+ }
+ if (index == TCP_RST_SET
&& ((test_bit(IPS_SEEN_REPLY_BIT, &ct->status)
&& ct->proto.tcp.last_index == TCP_SYN_SET)
|| (!test_bit(IPS_ASSURED_BIT, &ct->status)